Introduction
Following the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 , worldwide attention became focused on the Taliban and al-Qaida forces in Afghanistan. Prior to the attacks, many people had never heard of the Taliban or their shar'ia-law style of government. Since 2001, many splinter groups have formed in response to the continual United States presence in the region. Today, the term Taliban has been used to envelop several groups such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Haqqani Network (HQN) and the Tehrik-eNifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM). These groups make up the majority of fighters along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Many of these groups have been historic rivals for control of the region, but have since joined a loose alliance in response to United States and Pakistani Government actions in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This article examines the origins and operations of the Pakistani Taliban and associated groups. Particular attention will be given as to how these groups receive funding and support from each other through state sponsors such as Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency and non-state sponsors such as al-Qaida and Wahhabi idealists in Saudi Arabia, as well as arms supplies from Iran and potentially China.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
In early September 2004, the Pakistani Government sent eighty thousand army and Frontier Corps (FC) forces into the FATA of South Waziristan. Militant members of the Mehsud tribe, aligned in ideology to the Taliban and residents of the FATA, repelled the attacks by conducting ambushes of army convoys. These tribal fighters had long objected to any interference by the Pakistani forces in the region. 1 The battle resulted in a stalemate, with the army capitulating control of the FATA to the tribal fighters. Around the same time, a prominent militant leader, Baitullah Mehsud, launched attacks on tribal leaders who favored negotiations with the Pakistani Government. Mehsud labeled his group the TTP. To ensure success, the TTP received ideological support from al-Qaida senior leadership, logistical support from the Afghanistan Taliban, intelligence support from 3 By all indications, al-Qaida continues to provide TTP with ideological support through its media outlets the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) and the Foundation for Islamic Media Publication (As-Sahab) by praising TTP leaders and encouraging further attacks on the Pakistani Government. 4 South Waziristan's western border leads directly into Afghanistan's Paktika province. Paktika has been a stronghold of the Afghanistan Taliban and has often been the site of attacks on coalition forces. The Taliban view Paktika as a strategic center of gravity as it leads to Kabul and the Tora Bora mountains. The TTP allow Afghan Taliban forces to use bases in South Waziristan to launch these attacks and share logistics with the parent movement. 5 This cooperation between groups allows both to flourish in terms of supply and maneuver.
Mehsud and the TTP appeared to operate with impunity in the South Waziristan agency. This freedom of maneuver came in the face of continued Pakistani military incursions into the region. Reports have indicated that the ISI provided support to Mehsud in the form of advance warning of impending military actions in Waziristan. 6 Mehsud was finally killed by a United States Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) in August 2009. The power vacuum has created some instability in the TTP, but the core faction is largely intact and under the leadership of Hakimullah Mehsud, a top commander in Orakzai province and cousin to the slain Baitullah.
Funding
The TTP receives substantial funding from three primary areas. First, the local madrassas have provided Mehsud with funding for his insurgency. Madrassas receive funding from prominent Muslims in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, which is then often funneled through the madrassa system into the hands of the TTP. Second, the TTP is indirectly funded from wealthy benefactors who share a common ideology of shar'ia law and subscribe to the 9 These actions emboldened Haqqani and served to drive his group further under the influence of the overall Taliban movement. In addition, both HQN and TTP share access to opium smuggling routes allowing the drugs to move in and out of Afghanistan with relative ease. These actions are also a source of considerable funding for the group and allow future operations.
Haqqani has an established personal relationship with Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri and was once the commander of all Taliban forces in Afghanistan when they battled the Northern Alliance in the late 1990s. Haqqani receives significant ideological and media support from alQaida's media network. Videos of HQN suicide bombers are broadcast on the GIMF websites to inspire other radical elements to action. Many of alQaida's messages include HQN as a member of their organization. While this is not entirely true, Haqqani capitalizes on this relationship in order to raise funds from benefactors sympathetic to al-Qaida's cause. The Waziristan Accord between the Pakistani Government and tribal elders in Waziristan, brokered by Haqqani, has allowed the HQN to grow in strength and influence. Finally, Haqqani receives considerable funding from wealthy Saudis and Gulf state Islamists. As one of the few movements that include a large number of foreign fighters, Haqqani has cultivated a strong relationship that ensures future funding. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states view Haqqani as an asset while downplaying any relationship to the United States. Radical Islamists see both the HQN and the TTP as models for future Islamic armies.
Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)
The militant group capturing most of the headlines in Pakistan today is Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM). Founded in 1992 by Maulana Sufi Mohammad in response to the United States' presence in Pakistan, the TNSM has attempted to implement shar'ia law in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Provinces (NWFP). 10 The TNSM rose to prominence in 2001 when Sufi Mohammad rallied thousands of Pakistani tribesmen to fight the Northern Alliance. This campaign was closely monitored and supported by Pakistan's ISI.
As the United States war in Afghanistan began, the Pakistani Government closed the border but turned a blind eye to any militants wanting to fight for the Taliban. 11 These militants returned to Pakistan and began a cam- The TNSM has waged a bloody offensive in the NWFP with actions in the Swat District and has exerted considerable influence in the agencies of Dir, Malakand, and Bajaur. The TNSM receives support in several areas. First, internal financial support for the group comes from radical mosques and madrassas. Funds from these entities allow the group to continue its struggle against the Pakistani Government. Second, TNSM fighters have taken control of the emerald mines in Swat Valley. The group retains about a third of the profits earned from these mines. This is significant considering that these emerald mines have historically yielded approximately 10 percent of the world's uncut gems, worth about US$15 million. 12 Finally, the TNSM profits from smuggling activity in the border agencies of Bajaur and Dir. Opium smuggled through these routes heads either through Central Asia and on to Europe or across Kashmir toward Asia. Just as the HQN and TTP benefit from Saudi and Gulf State support, so too does the TNSM. This financial support is normally routed through charitable organizations and then filtered to the group for use.
Conclusion: Commonalities between the Three Groups
Although the three militant groups discussed are located in different areas and are from different tribes, they share four common beliefs that have led to a unified front for the time being. First, the groups all share a radical interpretation of Islam. This view aligns with the Taliban's goal of a strict implementation of shar'ia law. Second, all three groups vehemently oppose the presence of the United States in Afghanistan. As the Taliban and al-Qaida continue to call for Muslims to oppose the occupation, the groups are able to set aside tribal and cultural differences to unite against an outside force. Third, the groups oppose the Pakistani Government in terms of democratic reforms and an attempt to impose any form of rule in the NWFP and FATA; the actions of the Pakistani army, at the urging of the United States, have actually made the situation worse for the government. Finally, all of the groups are profiting from the conflict in terms of finances and power. Hakimullah Mehsud, Haqqani, and Fazlullah have emerged as the leaders of their respective groups and have benefited from continued actions. They will continue to support each other and the Taliban as long as it continues to prove profitable in terms of ideology, power, and funds.
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